India's tightrope walk is now famous.
The apt handling has ensured that India has good and not so bad ties with all powerful and geopolitical centres.
It has working ties with Tehran.
It is a friend of Moscow and a strong trade partner with Washington.
It understands the geo-strategic importance of China in today's era too.
There is an emphasis on climate of trust.
There is a push for a healthy climate of economic cooperation.
It is rebuilding trust elsewhere; and in many places -- it is a work in progress. New Delhi does not believe in 'can happen overnight' philosophy.
India’s ties with both Iran and Russia have roots that go far deeper than today’s oil trade.
New Delhi's relations with the Soviet Union were established in April 1947, a few months before Indian independence.
During the Cold War, Moscow became a crucial economic, military and diplomatic partner. On Kashmir and other matters, the Soviet Union used its UN Security Council (UNSC) vote in ways that supported Indian interests.
Even Modi Govt has admitted that the history still matters. India now continues to seek a permanent seat in UNSV of its own. It's friendship with China and Russia really matter a lot.
India realises the power of BRICS, RIC and more importantly - the prowess of some bilateral ties including with Iran.
But Team Modi - of PM, NSA Ajit Doval and foreign minister Dr S Jaishankar know that 'strategic autonomy' cannot mean dependence on any one partner.
One can call it post-Covid phenomenon. Others may see it as the lesson of the Ukraine war.
One thing is clear -- the so called 'great-power relationships' can change fast.. at times at the speed of social media postings.
Russia’s growing dependence on China is one such case. This has reflected that even an historically close partner can become less strategically independent.
Hence, the objective is not to choose between one capital or the other.
In fact all capitals including Colombo, Kathmandu, Seoul, Moscow and Washington matter.
New Delhi's foreign policy engine room needs to ensure that India does not have to choose at all.
Meaning it has to be 'self reliant' in more ways than one; and at the same time it has to maintain a bond of 'inter-dependence' with Tehran, Beijing, Washington and Moscow.
It needs London and vice versa and the same pragmatic yardstick must apply with Tokyo as well.
The multilateral platforms such as SCO and BRICS provide opportunities for all sides to better understand each other. For his part Chinese president Xi Jinping has himself proved by agreeing to visit New Delhi.
Xi stayed away from G-20 Summit of 2023. And this is where lies a difference between 2026 and 2023 -- a mere gap of three years.
In the context of Iran -- the conflict on the surface might have ended for most.
But for many nations, societies and individuals trauma and crisis continue. In journalistic sense; there are still stories that remain untold. This has a fallout in diplomatic sense too.
People are therefore expecting a positive outcome between Iran and India during the summit.
Moreover, Tehran is in hard times.
Iranian inflation runs near 70 percent and the IMF expects a contraction above five percent. Exclusion from dollar payment infrastructure did harm as it did to Russia, Venezuela and Afghanistan.
There are key aspects of survival. But there are stories — of loss and resilience too.
The psychological scars, unhealed wounds, and struggles would remain. Diplomacy cannot be away from these even after the fighting stops.
Today, we have a new geopolitical environment from which US wants to extract itself. But most of it is triggered by Donald Trump.
There is 'destabilized' Central Asia and Gulf. But US has accelerated the global energy transition on its adversaries' terms.
The American economic standing is weakened. It is time for BRICS to do some muscle flexing.
The India-Russia, India-Iran and the RIC equilibrium will be the suitable things to address.
ends
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