Chinese strategists, like their Indian counterparts, remain cautiously optimistic about the development as they feel there are still many negative factors plaguing the long-term development of China-India relations that will not be easily resolved by the solution to the border issue.
PM Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held their first bilateral meeting in five years in Kazan in Russia on the sidelines of BRICS Summit.
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held their first bilateral meeting in five years in the Russian city of Kazan, the initial reaction of Chinese media was that “the China-India solution is an opportunity worth cherishing”.
Although it may look like a “sudden development”, Chinese observers pointed out that a “quiet but significant” shift in China-India relations had already been underway in the past few months.
In May, China appointed its new ambassador to India after a gap of 18 months. In July, the Chinese and Indian foreign ministers met twice within a month. Progress was also made in border affairs consultations as the two sides held the 30th and 31st border affairs consultations in New Delhi and Beijing, respectively, at the end of July and August.
In September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with National Security Adviser Ajit Doval in St. Petersburg. All these developments laid the foundation for reaching a solution to the border issue and created favourable conditions for the Modi-Xi meeting.
According to Zhang Jiadong, director of the South Asia Research Center of Fudan University, the China-India relationship, which has been hovering at the bottom of a U-shaped curve for a very long time and was not able to find a new breakthrough point, did not deteriorate into conflict but strove to break out of the impasse.
The level of relations can rise along the curve will depend on two aspects: 1) the implementation of the “solution” to the border issue, and 2) how effectively India can loosen its restrictions on China in areas such as investment and people-to-people connections, according to an article in "India Today".
Interestingly, Russia’s role as a peacemaker, playing an important part in easing Sino-Indian tensions, figured prominently in Chinese discussions. Some Chinese observers were of the opinion that the progress in Sino-Indian border negotiations means trilateral cooperation between Russia, India, and China (RIC) will also move forward according to Russia’s vision.
The idea of RIC’s revival has been doing the rounds in Chinese strategic circles for some time now, ever since Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed his hope of convening a China-Russia-India trilateral meeting at the 10th “Primakov Readings” International Forum on June 26.
Although Beijing has traditionally been skeptical about Russia’s role as a peacemaker between China and India, and often accused Russia of having a vested interest in a potential India-China conflict, of late China has shown interest in such a proposition on the grounds that: * China believes that Russia may now have a greater interest in China-India reconciliation, as it could help Russia break through the Western economic and diplomatic blockade.
** Some Chinese observers argued that “with the United States and Canada openly supporting the Sikh separatist (Khalistan) movement and there being reports of the CIA lurking in India’s Northeastern states to further instigate secessionist activities”, this is possibly an opportune moment to re-energise the trilateral format.
Chinese scholar Lou Chunhao, Executive Director of the South Asian Studies Institute at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, have highlighted, in the current scenario, with bilateral channels between China and India deadlocked and India’s enthusiasm to cooperate with China in BRICS or the SCO in decline, a trilateral option holds value for China.
On the other hand, Chinese scholars believe that there are multiple factors that brought India to the negotiating table, ranging from India’s China dependence, the economic burden of long-term military confrontation, the US preoccupation with Europe and the Middle East, and its inadequate security commitment towards India, among others.
They further believe that the other key reason behind India’s decision could be to maintain the unity, cooperation, and sanctity of BRICS.
The China-India conflict had been negatively impacting the effectiveness of the grouping, and India was under tremendous pressure from fellow group members to mend ties with China.
Moreover, given the rise in BRICS’s popularity, the momentum created by the construction of a new independent BRICS payment system, and the prospect of reconstruction of the global economic landscape, India could ill afford to let the platform being hijacked by China.
India wanted to make its presence felt, its voice heard at this critical juncture through its active participation and strong support for the grouping, including extending an olive branch to China.
Territorial disputes, water resource allocation, competition for regional influence, competition over global supply chains, and issues related to Pakistan, Tibet, and Taiwan are all real challenges that cannot be evaded.
Even within BRICS, China-India differences continue to linger on issues such as the acceptance of the Yuan as a BRICS common currency, India’s demand for the inclusion of the Rupee, and the non-binding nature of any new “BRICS Settlement System”.
In fact, the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting held last month failed to produce a joint statement for the first time in the grouping’s history, due to internal disagreements over a proposal by India, Brazil, and South Africa.
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