Friday, January 19, 2024

Gwadar and Chabahar ports -- to which India is also a party; Mistrust runs deep between Iran and Pakistan


The shift in militant ideologies, coupled with the economic interests of Pakistan and Iran due to Gwadar and Chabahar and long-porous border has heightened tensions between the two countries.


This situation is likely to stay restive unless both countries reconsider their treatment of their respective Baloch populations, says an article in Pakistani newspaper 'Dawn'. 












 The rise of Jaish al-Adl


Jaish al-Adl, also known as the Army of Justice, was established in 2012 in the border regions of Pakistan and Iran. Although its leadership remains largely unknown, it is widely believed that Mullah Omar Irani was one of its key founders. 


The group came into the spotlight after a roadside bomb in Saravan killed 13 Revolutionary Guards in October 2013.


In response, for the first time, Iran fired a deadly missile at Kulahu, the compound run by Mullah Omar Irani in Kech one month after the Saravan bombings. Mullah Omar survived, though his house and an adjacent mosque were damaged.


The cycle of violence continued. In February 2014, Jaish al-Adl kidnapped four Iranian soldiers and allegedly brought them into Pakistan, prompting accusations from Iran about Pakistan’s failure to control cross-border infiltration. Iran threatened to send troops into Pakistan if the soldiers were not released. The soldiers were eventually released in April of that year.


In October 2014, a botched attack by Jaish al-Adl resulted in the deaths of four Iranian security forces members in Saravan. This time, Brigadier General Hussein Salami of Saravan threatened to send troops into Pakistan if it failed to rein in Jaish al-Adl. 



By March 2016, the situation had further intensified, with Pakistan also accusing Iran of providing shelter to Baloch separatists involved in an insurgency in Pakistan following the arrest of Kulbushan Jadhav, a retired Indian navy officer in the Mashkel area of Balochistan, near the Iranian border.


Tensions rose further when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced plans to build and operate the Chabahar port during his visit to Iran in May 2016. 

Iran started viewing Gwadar as a competitor to its Chabahar port. 


The blame game escalated, with Iran launching rockets into Pakistan’s border towns. In July 2017, Iran fired a barrage of rockets into Panjgur.






In June 2017, the Foreign Office for the first time confirmed that the Pakistan Air Force had shot down an Iranian drone flying in Pakistan’s Panjgur territory. In July 2019, Pakistani forces seized an Iranian spy drone in Chagai, further aggravating the blame game. Despite the ongoing tensions, Pakistan refrained from escalating the situation; rather, attempting to calm the situation diplomatically.


Mistrust runs deep

On a November evening in 2020, Turbat police allegedly shot dead Iran’s most-wanted militant leader, Mullah Omar Irani, along with his two sons in an alleged encounter, just two days after Iran’s Foreign Minister Jawad Zarif visited Islamabad. Mullah Irani had been in hiding in Turbat’s posh Satellite Town, according to the police.


But this blame game is no longer a one-sided now. In January, April and June 2023, Pakistan accused Iran of being behind three attacks in Pakistan launched by Baloch separatists. In April 2019, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, the then foreign minister, accused Iran of providing bases to Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), an umbrella organisation of Baloch separatist groups that attacked a bus in Balochistan, killing 14 passengers.


Despite the ongoing blame game, Pakistan’s security forces assisted in safely recovering nine Iranian border guards out of 12 who were abducted by militants from the Lulakdan area near the Pak-Iran border in October 2018. This was followed by the killing of Mullah Irani.


In spite of these overtures, the mistrust continued to run deep.


The intrusions by Iran on Tuesday evening were unprecedented and more lethal compared to past attacks. The strike may have been prompted by the attacks on the Iranian town of Rask in December by Jaish al-Adl, in which 11 Iranian security personnel were killed.


Since February 2021, Siestan-o-Baluchistan has witnessed heightened tensions following the killing of 10 Baloch fuel carriers by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards near Saravan. The region saw widespread protests, which gained momentum after the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022. To quell the protests, Iran executed at least 354 people, including six women, in the first half of 2023.


According to the Norway-based Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), Baloch minorities comprised 20 per cent of all executions. These actions have garnered even more support for Jaish al-Adl. As a result, the terrorist outfit has increased its attacks on Iranian forces.


Pakistan, meanwhile, has a complex relationship with its Baloch population with an escalation in the Baloch insurgency over the years. However, Iran no longer perceives Baloch nationalism within Pakistan as a threat, as it does not advocate for a greater Balochistan and it poses no threat to the Iranian regime.


Likewise, Pakistan doesn’t feel threatened by Iran-based Baloch militants since they no longer align with a nationalist ideology but a sectarian one. 



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