By Nirendra Dev
The Iran war must be read through a wider geopolitical lens — one that frames the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral not as a cohesive bloc, but as a fractured triangle that Washington is strategically invested in keeping that way.
The RIC dialogue was initiated in the late 1990s by then-Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov as a direct counter to what Moscow perceived as an emerging US-dominated unipolar world.
India, especially under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, was then equally invested in protecting its strategic autonomy — exemplified by New Delhi’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) despite intense American pressure.
But the bloc has since frayed. The three nations responded differently to the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, the subsequent Gaza war, and the 12-day Israel-Iran war of June 2024. These divergences surfaced publicly at BRICS and SCO forums, blocking the consensus needed for joint statements.
Border tensions between India and China, compounded by Russia’s singular focus on Ukraine, have led analysts to treat RIC as a “closed chapter” — or at least a diminished forum.
The US seeks to preserve its global hegemony by keeping emerging and regional powers — these RIC members — weakened through economic means. Hence, it is opposed to connectivity projects such as the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative, the Russian-backed INSTC, and the Indian-financed Chabahar Port project.
It may be argued that Washington pressurised India into exiting the Chabahar Port project shortly before the outbreak of the war.
Iran is a great geopolitical prize for any great power, and hence the Americans are seeking to seize the prize. At the same time, for geopolitical reasons, Washington has paved the way for Israel’s regional hegemony.
Today, all three RIC nations are separately negotiating with the Trump administration — with little alignment. India and China are managing trade talks while preventing bilateral relations from deteriorating further. Moscow oscillates between confronting Washington and appeasing Trump over Ukraine.
Yet cooperation remains theoretically possible — in Central Asia, the Arctic, and Russia’s Far East, spanning energy, agriculture, transport, and infrastructure. The obstacle is trust, particularly between India and China, and the ever-complicating shadow of sanctions on Russia.
A US failure in Iran, after similar experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, could erode prestige of Washington — and in turn strengthen the Russian and Chinese-backed vision of a multipolar world order.
As the strategic dust settles, Israel gains centrality, the I2U2 grouping acquires new relevance, and the RIC remains what it has long been — more potential than reality.
Courtesy - The Raisina Hills
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