Bangladesh and Myanmar require closer and more serious strategic attention than they have received so far. These theatres are not peripheral developments but integral to India’s long-term vision of Viksit Bharat 2047.
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Today, the narrative has become even more complex. Political leaders in Western democracies increasingly adopt identity-driven positions, while selectively invoking issues from other countries, including India. Global politics has entered a phase where optics, ideology, and power calculations are deeply intertwined.
Despite these contradictions, realism must prevail. Indo-US relations remain important and cannot be dismissed. What is essential, however, is a framework in which India’s enlightened self-interest—what may be described as Moditva—can coexist with active American engagement in South Asia without hierarchical constraints.
Why Bharat Won’t Accept Junior Global Role
From ‘Superpower Rising’ in 1989 to Modi’s strategic autonomy today, India’s ascent reshapes American interests in Asia
The idea of Viksit Bharat 2047 is not merely aspirational but anchored in a long strategic trajectory that predates contemporary politics.
Nearly 36 years ago, in 1989, Time magazine described India as “Superpower Rising,” recognising it as the strongest country in the subcontinent.
That assessment came in the backdrop of decisive Indian action, including Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s intervention to stall a coup in the Maldives—an act that impressed US President Ronald Reagan, who described it as “a valuable contribution to regional stability.”
Since then, India’s strategic profile has expanded significantly. Its military strength, diplomatic weight, and regional influence are now widely acknowledged.
Even in the late 1980s, American strategic thinkers were urging Washington to recalibrate its South Asia policy. Selig Harrison of the Carnegie Foundation argued that the United States should accept regional realities, step away from its special relationship with Pakistan, and “get out of India’s way.” That advice, however, was never fully implemented.
Pakistan continued to enjoy strategic indulgence from Washington—first as a Cold War ally against the Soviet Union and later as a partner in the so-called war on terror.
Ironically, Islamabad once complained that India’s role as a regional policeman had been tacitly sanctioned by the United States.
While intended as criticism, the remark also underscored India’s growing stature. New Delhi, however, clearly understood the risks embedded in such a hierarchy, because a “policeman” ultimately answers to higher authority.
A rising India has never been the core problem for the United States.
The challenge lies in India’s insistence on autonomy. Washington seeks a larger say in South Asian diplomacy and security, whereas India, as a self-respecting nation with its own civilisational outlook, prefers strategic independence.
This divergence has become more pronounced under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for whom self-reliance and independent decision-making are not negotiable.
This explains why trade tensions surfaced in 2025 and why friction in Indo-US relations should not come as a surprise.
Aligning formally as an American ally appealed to sections of Indian opinion in the 1990s and continues to do so even today. Yet geopolitical reality demands vigilance. India must examine whether recent US administrations—including Joe Biden’s—have tilted toward Pakistan, and why even Donald Trump appears keen to maintain or revive patronage of Islamabad.
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| Joe Biden |
At the heart of the issue lies an enduring American worldview in which the US leads and allies follow.
As early as 1991, columnist Flora Lewis wrote in the International Herald Tribune that some Americans, buoyed by military success, believed the United States should act as the world’s policeman.
Fast-forward to 2025–26, and that mindset now confronts a transformed global order that increasingly resembles a post-US, or at least post-Western, world. The rise of RIC and the expansion of BRICS have redefined global power equations.
India, Russia, and China occupy central positions in both groupings, leaving Western capitals unsettled and uncertain about how to respond. This anxiety is reflected in shifting narratives around oil politics, regional conflicts, and strategic alignments.
The world has witnessed the liberation of Kuwait, the conquest of Iraq, and wars framed as moral crusades. It has also lived through periods when analysts openly spoke of a civilisational or “holy” war between the Christian West and the Muslim world.
Today, the narrative has become even more complex. Political leaders in Western democracies increasingly adopt identity-driven positions, while selectively invoking issues from other countries, including India.
Global politics has entered a phase where optics, ideology, and power calculations are deeply intertwined.
Despite these contradictions, realism must prevail. Indo-US relations remain important and cannot be dismissed. What is essential, however, is a framework in which India’s enlightened self-interest—what may be described as Moditva—can coexist with active American engagement in South Asia without hierarchical constraints.
This is precisely why evolving situations in Bangladesh and Myanmar require closer and more serious strategic attention than they have received so far. These theatres are not peripheral developments but integral to India’s long-term vision of Viksit Bharat 2047.
(Nirendra Dev)
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