How India, UAE are building the world's next power corridor
PM Narendra Modi's visit to Abu Dhabi came in the backdrop of the two nations quietly assembling a strategic architecture for a fractured world
Successive Indian governments deferred filling even existing capacity against competing fiscal priorities while consumption skyrocketed from 158 million metric tonnes in 2013-14 to 239 million metric tonnes in 2023-24.
A parliamentary standing committee as recently as March 2026 urged the government to reach the 90-day benchmark, a target that has remained aspirational for decades.
The Middle East has rarely felt this unstable. Gaza bleeds. Houthi drones circle over Red Sea shipping lanes. The Strait of Hormuz—that narrow stretch through which a fifth of the world’s oil flows daily—sits permanently on the edge, hostage to the slow-motion confrontation between Iran and the US-Israel axis.
Oil prices lurch. Container routes are being changed. And the geopolitical map of West Asia, redrawn by the Arab Spring and the Abraham Accords, is shifting yet again under the weight of the ongoing conflict.

Amidst these volatile circumstances, Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in the United Arab Emirates, and what he is building there is anything but routine diplomacy.
For most of the past half century, India’s relationship with the Gulf was essentially a bargain of convenience: crude oil, remittances and millions of Indian workers shuttling between the two worlds.
That bargain served both sides adequately. But it was never a strategy. Today, that is precisely what India and the UAE are constructing—a strategic corridor spanning energy, defence, maritime industry, sovereign capital and artificial intelligence, designed to give both nations resilience in an uncertain era.
The foundation beneath these developments is the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement already signed between the two countries, which has pushed bilateral trade to record levels and created the commercial infrastructure within which this deeper strategic partnership is being built.
Begin with oil, because oil is where everything in this region ultimately begins. India is the world’s third-largest consumer of crude oil, importing close to 90 per cent of what it burns. Half of that comes from Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the UAE, all of it passing through the Strait of Hormuz. That single chokepoint is the daily reality underpinning the Indian economy right now.
Against that exposure, India’s strategic oil reserves are a study in inadequacy: three underground caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangalore and Padur, covering only 9.5 days of crude oil requirement at full capacity, and currently filled to just 64 per cent, covering five days.
Japan holds over 200 days of oil reserves, China over 100. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recommends 90 days. The United States held 413 million barrels as of late last year. India’s entire stockpile fits inside that number more than 10 times over.
The two sides also committed to establishing strategic gas reserves inside India, beginning to address the country’s near-total absence of any gas equivalent to its petroleum buffer.
The West Asia region has already faced Iran’s barrages of missiles and drones, intercepted by UAE air defence systems, a reminder that the threats animating these agreements are not hypothetical. Modi’s formal declaration during the visit in favour of unimpeded navigation through the Strait of Hormuz was, therefore, a statement on existential national interest.
Energy, however, is only the foundation. Built atop it is a maritime layer that reflects a sharper strategic ambition. The memorandum of understanding between Cochin Shipyard Limited and Drydocks World to develop a ship repair cluster at Gujarat’s Vadinar signals genuine intent to enter a global industry long dominated by China, South Korea and Japan.
India, despite 7,500 km of coastline astride major shipping lanes, has remained largely marginal to this ecosystem. That marginality is now becoming untenable. Maritime infrastructure is no longer merely commercial infrastructure. It is geopolitical infrastructure.
China understood this early and built it relentlessly through the Gwadar, Hambantota and Djibouti ports. Its Belt and Road Initiative was, at its core, an infrastructure-power strategy.
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