West Bengal provincial polls may decide which idea of India shall
New Delhi/Kolkata
The West Bengal Assembly Election 2026 is increasingly framed as a contest between native Bengali culture and the BJP’s Hindi–Hindu push.
The most striking irony is political convergence. The state's ruling party Trinamool Congress long accused of Muslim appeasement now speaks loudly about building a Jagannath temple and a few others dedicated to Hindu deities. Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s outreach to Hindu voters—once unthinkable—has earned her the label of a “seasonal Hindu.”
As they say; Bengal is changing and so is India. And the question 2026 will answer is not merely who wins power in Kolkata —once the seat of British Colonial power -- but rather whose idea of India prevails.
Since Modi became Prime Minister more than 11 years ago, India has undergone a silent cultural transformation—anti-elite, anti-English, and increasingly anti-intellectual. Modi’s 2025 call to end India’s “western mindset” by 2035 only reinforced this shift. Ironically, the regime has also produced a new elite—provincial, pro-Hindi, and unapologetically majoritarian.
In Bengal, this transformation collides with a strong sense of linguistic and cultural selfhood. What once empowered Mamata Banerjee—anti-Left liberalism—made her nearly invincible. Today, however, Hindutva forces want to challenge the Trinamool Congress head-on.
Against an electorate fragmented by caste and religion, the BJP has previously demonstrated its ability to stitch together a pan-Hindu vote in electorally crucial states. Translating less than one-third of the vote share into a parliamentary majority in 2014 and 2019 was not accidental—it reflected Narendra Modi’s personal charisma, disciplined organisation, and selective deployment of Hindu nationalist tropes where they resonated most.
In Mamata Banerjee-ruled Bengal, the BJP believes the contest transcends routine electoral arithmetic. For the saffron party, it is a battle to “protect civilisational values.” Over the last decade, the BJP has steadily worked to make its ideological triad—Hindu-Hindi-Hindustan—socially acceptable across large swathes of India. The success in municipal politics in Mumbai is cited internally as proof that slogans once dismissed as regional—like “Jai Shri Ram”—now carry national resonance.
Unlike its glorious intellectual and cultural past, West Bengal today is often described as a landscape of violence, turmoil, and persistent economic stagnation. The state that once produced Tagore, Vivekananda, Nazrul Islam, Satyajit Ray and Amartya Sen is now better known nationally for political killings, flight of capital, and social intimidation.
This decline did not happen overnight. Critics argue that the seeds were sown during the 34-year Left Front rule (1977–2011) and deepened under the Trinamool Congress (TMC) government led by Mamata Banerjee since 2011. The cumulative effect, they say, has been the collapse of Bengali culture as a confident, plural, and intellectually vibrant force.
Ironically, it is this vacuum that allowed the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to emerge as a serious challenger. Through sustained grassroots work, the BJP expanded its base among Rajbongshis, Namasudras, Matuas, Koch-Rajbongshis, smaller Adivasi groups, Christians, Gorkhas in the hills, and rural poor in districts like Bankura, Purulia, Birbhum, and Jhargram—despite its Hindutva-centric politics.
Amid repeated debate and political and social controversies on beef eating, a prominent Protestant, Pastor Saroj Roy, in Coochbehar in northern part of West Bengal told me recently -- "Beef eating is hardly an issue. We Rajbongshi Christians do not take beef".
"No one has asked us to eat or not to eat anything. My Bible and my religion tells me ..... if my eating anything causes any difficulties for any of my friends and neighbours; I should not eat the same," Roy said.
There are about 80 Christian families under his Church of God local church and he added: "As per my knowledge no Rajbongshi Christians in Coochbehar or even in north Bengal eat beef".
Many among these groups believe that appeasement of Muslims, practised first by the Left and later intensified by the TMC, made sections of Muslims politically assertive at the cost of SC, ST, and OBC Hindus in rural Bengal. Resentment also grew over allegations that Muslim communities cornered a disproportionate share of quota benefits of other underprivileged.
At the same time, Bengal’s traditional bhadralok elite—Brahmins, Kayasthas, and Baidyas, together less than a fifth of the population—continued to dominate academia, culture, media, and administration. For vast sections at the margins, the BJP became a vehicle of protest against this entrenched hierarchy.
Yet, the BJP’s challenge goes far beyond arithmetic. The Partition of Bengal, which inflicted disproportionate suffering on the poor and lower castes, still shapes the state’s psyche. Cultural identity here is layered, emotional, and deeply suspicious of ideological imposition.
As the 2026 Assembly election approaches, these tensions are being discussed—often in veiled terms. While the Left is remembered for ideological rigidity and economic decay, the TMC is increasingly accused of cultivating a “threat culture” marked by political violence and the erosion of free thought.
Aurobindo Sen, a retired banker, agrees, noting that the use of intimidation and “rowdyism” shows troubling continuity from the Left era.
Economically, the story remains bleak. Industrial investment continues to elude Bengal, reinforcing cultural stagnation and youth migration. This raises a central electoral question: can ‘poriborton’ truly happen under the BJP?
The BJP, however, carries its own baggage. Its Hindutva is not acceptable to most Hindus in this province who prefer pluralism. Moreover, mercurial leader Mamata Banerjee is also very popular at the grassroots level.
And by far she remains one of few regional players who is still resisting BJP strongly.
If the BJP succeeds here as it won Mumbai lately; the idea of India -- as it is known will be shakan with a possibility of long term fallout.
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