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| Xi and Modi: Gandhi Ashram, Ahmedabad |
“It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.”- Xi Jinping in 2014 -- making it clear that the western or the US influence must be minimised in Asia.
This certainly reflects Chinese uneasiness on growing Indo-US ties as also the formation of QUAD between India, the US, Japan and Australia.
Encouraged by overwhelming 'positive responses' to my previous piece piece on Xi Jinping published in 'Phoenix Post' on June 29, 2020, I am offering here one more piece on him but largely concentrating on his 'new' concept of foreign policy - that focuses on a new type of relations with global players and that will also have a diplomacy with typical Chinese characteristics.
Xi has already demonstrated that he is a determined man and a more decisive leader than most of
his predecessors.
But Chinese establishment has reasons to feel bad about growing bonhomie between India, the US, Japan and Australia.
Giving this QUAD a further push, defence sources in Delhi say the Modi government could
invite Australia to join the annual Malabar naval exercise that has so far included just Japan and the U.S.
Making a clear forward movement in November 2017 at Philippines capital Manila, India, the US, Japan and Australia
had joined hands to enhance security cooperation in the Indo Pacific region and thus sought to build up
fresh pressure on China.
The move certainly gave a 'clearer shape' to a new Security Architecture especially in the
blue waters and in a region where China has been flexing muscles.
Within a year of his taking charge (in 2012), the Chinese government under Xi in 2013 articulated that
on the internal front, it has pledged to and hopes to "promote, through our diplomacy," the Chinese culture,
contribute Chinese wisdom to the handling of international relations, share China's governance experience and offer Chinese solutions to improve global governance.
All these also seek to provide more public goods for humanity to meet a variety of new challenges of the 21st century, it was said.
The diplomacy of 'New China' has traversed an extraordinary journey over the past sixty years and more, said Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi at the Second World Peace Forum, June 27, 2013 to be precise.
He had also categorically stated that: "In the new era, China will stay committed to its independent foreign policy and firmly safeguard national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in its diplomacy. We will decide on our own policies and positions on the merit of an issue without being attached or submissive to any external force. We regard this as the spirit and strength of China's diplomacy".
Thus, if they have taken a stance and drawn military strategy at Galwan, the Xi Jinping dispensation will continue to be on the same warpath in one form or the other.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi on July 3, 2020 visited Leh and underlined that "expansionist" designs will no longer work or go a long way in the new world order.
But Chinese foreign policy as understood from the trajectory drawn by Xi Jinping's leadership is precisely on that line - the expansionist designs.
This is not only a mere contradiction in Chinese approaches, it poses challenges too. Some analysts suggest that Mr Modi also knows it well that this is going to be a long drawn engagement along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
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| The Phoenix Post, Port Blair |
Hence it is imperative that the Indian authorities would try to read in between the words and lines.
It goes without stating that the new ideas of the Xi era reflect transitions in China’s place in the international system, its military strength, global influence and by way of economic and political powers.
But before marching on further on this, it ought to be understood that the Chinese diplomacy has not been transparent and very clear from the beginning.
However, there is a paradoxical element that it has benefited from its ambiguity. Look at Beijing's Pakistan policy vis-a-vis
UN system and other multilateral platforms.
It has tried to be Pakistan's all weather friend and a mentor! On issues like terrorism etc, there has been always a disconnect
between China's rhetoric and actions on ground.
But over the years while such ambiguity has remained a constant factor, China under Xi Jinping was and is obviously different
from what it was under Mao Zedong, who had ruled as the chairman of the Communist Party of China
from its establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976.
Experts say China wanted to be 'left alone' to undergo - what it believed - a revolutionary transformation and of course
without outside 'interference'.
Nevertheless, while this approach did not bother a Chinese citizen in his country, gradually the 'control' regime
has started leaving an impact on domestic politics too.
Thus when some New Delhi-based journalists including this writer visited China in August 2019, there were discussions
but amid the huskier voice on whether the Chinese society has already turned 'more and more' muted.
My specific interactions on the same with some individuals (of course Chinese) informally provided no
clear answer whether this silence is only a genuine by-product of fear or it is a resultant of people's
utter most "trust" in the Chinese Communist Party and the leadership.
On this backdrop comes the relevance of Prime Minister Modi's cautioning that 'expansionist' will either be
defeated or will have to take a turn or retreat in different directions.
Modi's hint was on Xi Jinping - with whom he had tried to build up a personal rapport and also attended two
informal Summits in 2018 and 2019.
But as a pragmatic politician, Modi will do well to understand the political compulsions of Xi Jinping.
If there is a charge of 'deceitfulness' against China today vis-a-vis Galwan breach of trust, all of it cannot be blamed
on President Xi Jinping personally. The Chinese president needs troubles along Indian border to stem some possible
unhappiness among comrades in his own country and the party.
It must be also noted that Beijing is guided less by ideology or the issues of right and wrong. Chinese strategies
including with the US and India are in effect 'guided by baser instincts' of typical medieval period - absolute power
and larger territory.
China is very much uncomfortable to see its own international discomfort - like corona crisis and also
its isolation even on issues of terrorism. Internationally, there have been many 'loyalists' but most trusted
friends or similarities are two ugly regimes of North (DPR) Korea and Pakistan.
China is obviously displeased by the language of assertiveness from the Modi regime.
It has also taken with a pinch of salt the Modi government's firm stance on abolition of Article 370 and
BJP leaders' references to Aksai Chin.
Xi Jinping's regime has been 'unhappy' to see India's rise as its chief competitor in Asia and also
as a strategic and most trusted ally of the United States.
Moreover, QUAD formulated in 2017 in the Philippines during ASEAN Summit by India, the US, Japan and
Australia did not go well with Beijing.
China has reasons to be uncomfortable!
As it is these four members are 'strong democracies' and though still an informal umbrella body, the QUAD
grouping has been coordinating efforts lately with three new crucial players - South Korea, New Zealand and Vietnam.
Thus, the relationship between China and Vietnam, South Korea and New Zealand could be also
negatively impacted, especially in the context of maritime policies.
ends
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